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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE MARTIN ENGLISH 
and UNITED PACIFIC 









BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
11156 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment on 
an automobile liability insurance policy. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
1. The lower court, as a matter of law, denied 
appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment in their 
favor wherein they requested the lower court to 
declare judgment that defendant's policy afforded 
liability coverage for George Martin English for 
1 
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claims arising out of an accident occurring May 14 
1966, in Salt Lake County. ' 
2. The lower court, as a matter of law, grant-
ed defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment de-
claring defendant's policy did not afford liability 
coverage for ~he claims arising from the accident 
of May 14, 1966, and entered judgment in favor 
of the defendant and against the plaintiffs on De-
cember 26, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment in 
the lower court and judgment in their favor as a 
matter of law. They pray that the lower court be 
ordered to make and enter judgment declaring that 
George Martin English was an insured of Dairyland 
Mutual Insurance Company at the time and place 
of the accident on May 14, 1966. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PARTIES 
Defendant Dairyland Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, (hereinafter called Dairyland), is an insur-
ance company at all times herein mentioned author-
ized to engage in writing automobile liability in-
surance in the State of Utah. Plaintiff, George M. 
English, (hereinafter called English), is an indi-
vidual residing in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff 
United Pacific Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
called United), is an insurance company at all times 
2 
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herein mentioned duly authorized to engage in the 
insurance business in the State of Utah. 
DAIRYLAND'S COVERAGE 
(Exhibit P. 1) 
English purchased policy No. 42-014844 from 
Daiyland for a premium of $266. This policy was 
in full force and effect from June 9, 1965, to June 
9, 1966. The policy afforded limits of $10,000/20,000 
BI and $5,000 PD liability coverage. 
In addition, under Section II of said policy, it 
provided that supplementary defense p a y me n ts 
would be made and that Dairyland would defend 
all suits against the insured English and pay all ex-
penses and costs incurred in def ending English 
against any claim for damages. 
The automobile described on Dairyland's policy 
was a 1964 Chevrolet Sport Impala. Section IV of 
Dairyland's policy is a clause of expansion and ex-
tends coverage to replacement vehicles. Section IV, 
subparagraph 4, provides: 
"Newly Acquired Automobile - an automo-
bile ownership of which is acquired by the 
nan;ed insured or his spouse if a resident of 
the same household, if ( i) it replaces an auix!-
mobile owned by either and covered by ~his 
policy, or the company insures all automobiles 
owned by the named ~nsured and .~uch spouse 
on the date of its delivery, and (ii) the nam-
ed Insured or such spouse notjties the CO'Y}'l-
pany within thirty days following such deliv-
3 
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ery date. \he insurance with respect to the 
newly acqmred automobile does not apply to 
any loss against which the named Insured or 
~uch spouse has other valid and collectible 
ms~r~nce. The l}amed Insured shall pay any 
additional premmm required because of the 
application of ~nsurance to such newly ac-
qmred automobile." (Emphasis added). 
AUTOMOBILE TRADES BY ENGLISH 
On February 15, 1966, English traded the 1964 
Sport Impala described on Dairyland's policy to Ma-
jestic Motors of Salt Lake City for a 1964 Monza 
Corvair and a 1961 Monza Corvair (R. 55, 61, 62). 
No notice of this trade of automobiles was giv-
en to defendant Dairyland by English (R. 55, 61, 
62). 
Approximately ten weeks later on April 28, 
1966, English and his wife traded the 1961 Monza 
Corvair and 1964 Monza Corvair in on a single 1966 
Corvair Monza convertible. Dairyland was notified 
on May 20, 1966, that the 1966 Monza Corvair had 
been delivered to English. Actual notice was given 
to Dairyland on May 20, 1966, following an accident 
that occurred on May 14, 1966 while English was 
using the 1966 Monza Corvair (R. 55, 61, 62). 
RATES AND FILING 
Dairyland admits the premium rate for liabil-
ity coverage on the 1966 Monza Corvair was and 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is exactly the same as on the 1964 Sport Impala (R. 
41, 45). 
Dairyland filed proof of financial responsibility 
for the period of its policy June 9, 1965 to June 9, 
1966. And Dairyland admits its policy was in force 
and effect on the date of the accident and does not 
claim its policy was invalid or void at the time of 
the accident ( R. 42, 45). 
INVOLVE ME NT OF UNITED 
On April 28 at the time English purchased a 
1966 Monza, Mrs. English, on behalf of her husband 
and herself, applied for complete insurance from 
the Archer-Ackerlind Agency. She explained her 
requirements to Mr. Ackerlind and arranged to 
have coverage effective on the 1966 Monza from 
April 28, 1966, covering comprehensive, collision, 
$100 deductible and medical payments. Further, she 
requested liability coverage, $10,000/20,000 BI and 
$5,000 PD, to be in effect from April 28, 1966, or 
upon the expiration of Dairyland's liability cover-
age. Mrs. English couldn't furnish Mr. Ackerlind 
the expiration date of Dairyland's policy and there-
fore he agreed to obtain coverage for Mrs. English, 
with the understanding that the comprehensive col-
lision and medical pay would take effect on April 
28, 1966, and the liability would take effect on that 
date or upon the date of the expiration of the policy 
of Dairyland if that policy was still in effect and 
still affording coverage. Before the date of expira-
5 
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tion of Dail'yland's policy was obtained for Mr. Ack-
erlind, the accident occurred ( R. 64, 65). 
After the accident occurred, Mr. Ackerlind re-
ported the accident to Dairyland and United. 
United was advised by English that Dairyland 
disclaimed coverage for the accident because Eng-
lish had not reported delivery to Dairyland of the 
two interim 1961 Monza Corvairs within thirty 
days of their delivery to English. 
Thereafter, United reasoned that if Dairy-
land's policy did not afford coverage, its policy did 
afford coverage and English and United agreed that 
United would defend the claims of Gray and Nel-
son against English and then they would seek re-
covery from Dairyland for the amount of loss, ex-
pense, judgment or settlement made. 
The reasonableness of United's settlements 
with Gray and English is not disputed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN INSURANCE POLICY SHOULD BE IN-
TERPRETED TO GIVE THE INSURED THE 
BROADEST PROTECTION. 
In Jorgensen vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 
(1962), 13 Utah 2d 303, 373 P.2d 580, this court 
said a policy should be interpreted to give the insur-
ed the broadest protection that could be reasonably 
understood by the terms of the policy. 
6 
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Stout vs. Washington Fire and Marine Insur-
ance Co., (1963), 14 Utah 2d 414, 385 P.2d 608, 
holds that in interpreting a liability insurance policy 
all doubts are resolved against the insurance com-
pany. Effort should be made to interpret an insur-
ance policy to afford coverage and not to deny cov-
erage. 
Appellants submit that contrary to the forego-
ing rules of construction the lower court strictly 
construed the policy against English and broadly 
construed the policy in favor of Dairyland. 
The lower court misinterpreted the newly ac-
quired automobile coverage and required English 
to give notice to Dairyland on March 16, 1966, or 
before, as to the first trades. However, Dairyland's 
policy merely required English to give notice of a 
newly acquired automobile within thirty days after 
delivery of said automobile to him. 
POINT II 
FAIL URE TO GIVE NOTICE OF FIRST RE-
PLACEMENTS DOES NOT DEFEAT COVER-
AGE FOR LAST REPLACEMENT AUTOMO-
BILE. 
Kaczmark vs. LaPierrier, ( 1953), Mich., 60 
NW 2d 327, correctly states the rule to be followed. 
In this case, the insured bought an Oldsmobile to 
replace a Packard covered under the policy and then 
without giving the insurance company notice of this 
change, subsequently acquired a Pontiac to replace 
7 
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the Oldsmobile and then notified the insurer of this 
last acquisition within thirty days of delivery of the 
Pontiac to him. In this case the court held the Pon-
tiac was a replacement of the Packard within the 
meaning of the automatic insurance clause afford-
ing coverage on ne"\v ly acquired automobiles not-
withstanding the insured's intervening ownership 
of the Oldsmobile. 
Appellants submit that if notice was to be given 
to the insurance company within thirty days after 
the described automobile is traded or sold, the in-
surance company could easily have made its inten-
tion understandable by providing that the company 
get notice within thirty days after trading or selling 
the described automobile. 
If giving notice within thirty days of selling 
the described automobile is required, the policy is 
ambiguous. 
POINT III 
AN INSURER CAN NOT RELY ON FAILURE 
TO GIVE NOTICE UNLESS PREJUDICE IS 
SHOWN. 
In Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, Sec-
tion 4293, it stated the condition requiring report-
ing during the policy period of a newly acquired 
automobile is for premium purposes only and not 
intended to effect a denial of coverage. 
Appleman's analysis is fair ~nd accu~at~ . in 
view of the fact the insurance premmm for bab1hty 
8 
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coverage on a 1966 Monza Corvair was the same as 
the premium for liability coverage on the 1964 Im-
pala described on the policy. 
In at least two cases this court has stated that 
failure to give notice by an insured is not a defense 
unles prejudice is shown. Rasmussen vs. Western 
Casualty & Surety Co., (1964), 15 Utah 2d 333, 393 
P.2d 376, involved a situation where an insured who 
had an audit type policy failed to give the insurer 
notice of the vehicle involved in the accident during 
a prior year. The insurer, Western Casualty & Sure-
ty Co., in that case took the position that failure to 
give notice of the automobile during the prior year 
defeated coverage. However, the court pointed out 
to the insurer that the insured was entitled to cover-
age and the insurance company's remedy was to col-
lect the additional premium and that it was not en-
titled to disclaim coverage. 
Johnson Red-E-Mix Construction Co. vs. United 
Pacific Insurance Co., (1961) 11 Utah 2d 279, 358 
P.2d 337, involved a situation where an insured 
waited three years to give the insurance company 
notice of an accident where the policy required no-
tice as soon as practical. This court said all the in-
sured was required to do was give notice as was 
reasonable and that the insured should not be de-
prived of the benefits for which it paid a premium 
when the insurer could not show it was prejudiced 
by the lack of notice. 
9 
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Unless by the replacement of one vehicle for 
another the risk has been materially increased there . ' 
is no basis for an insurance company to complain 
about failure to give notice within thirty days of de-
livery of the last replacement vehicle. 
Western Casualty & Surety Co. vs. Lund, 
(1956), 10 Cir. Okla., 234 F.2d 916, is the leading 
federal case on this question from the 10th Circuit. 
In this case Sprague purchased a DeSoto automobile 
on February 16, 1954. Later, Sprague traded the 
DeSoto for a Ford automobile and later traded the 
Ford automobile for an Oldsmobile on March 8, 
1964. While driving the Oldsmobile Sprague was 
involved in an accident and Western Casualty & 
Surety Company disclaimed coverage because he had 
failed to notify them of the substitution of automo-
biles within thirty days after the first trade was 
made. Western Casualty & Surety Company's policy 
defined newly acquired automobile as follows: 
"Newly Acquired Automobile - an automo-
bile, ownership of which is acquired by the 
named Insured, who is the owner of the de~­
cribed automobile, if the named Insured noti-
fies the company within thirty days followin$ 
the date of its delivery to him and if either it 
replaces an automobile described in the policy 
or the company insures all automobiles o~ed 
by the named i n s u r e d at such delivery 
date ... " 
The 10th Circuit Court held the purpose of the 
foregoing provision was to provide Sprague with 
10 
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automatic coverage and said giving of the notice 
within thirty days after delivery of the new vehicle 
was not a requisite to coverage and that the insured 
was covered without giving notice within thirty 
days. 
Maryland Indemnity & Fire Insurance Ex-
change vs. Steers, ( 1962) 21 Md. 380, 157 A.2d 803, 
involved a situation where a policy was issued in 
December of 1955 describing a 1946 Oldsmobile. 
Later and sometime prior to April of 1956, the Olds-
mobile became inoperative and the insured purchas-
ed a 1956 Dodge. The purchase of the Dodge was 
not brought to the attention of the insurer and when 
the policy was renewed in December of 1956, the 
Oldsmobile appeared as the described automobile. 
In March of 1957, the insured sold the Dodge and 
bought a 1955 Ford transferring the license plates 
from the Dodge to the Ford. In November of 1957, 
the insured, while driving the Ford, was involved in 
a collision and the insurance company endeavored 
to disclaim the coverage because of the insured's 
failure to notify the company of the first replace-
ment of the Oldsmobile with the Dodge. The court 
held the replacement of the Oldsmobile with the 
Dodge and the Dodge with the Ford was not ma-
terial and was in fact immaterial under the terms 
of the policy as there was no increase in hazard and 
then held the Ford to be covered as a newly acquired 
replacement automobile. 
11 
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Ashgrove Lime and Portland Cement Co. vs. 
Southern Surety Co., ( 1931), 225 Mo. App. 712, 
39 SW 2d 434, is an early leading case on this sub-
ject. In this case, the insured exchanged an automo-
bile for one listed on the policy. No notice of the ex-
change was given and five months later after the 
date of exchange, an accident occurred. The policy 
required no notice of an exchange as a con di ti on of 
the policy to afford coverage. The Missouri Court 
held the notice provision was not for the purpose of 
allowing the insured to say whether or not it was 
willing to exchange coverage for a newly acquired 
automobile, but was rather to protect the insurer in 
collecting an additional premium on such cars. The 
court concluded the provision was not a condition 
precedent to coverage as the policy contained no 
forfeiture provision for failure to perform the con-
dition. Since this case was decided many other auth-
orities have yielded to this line of reasoning. 
The provision in Dairyland's policy in the newly 
acquired automobile clause providing that the nam-
ed insured shall pay any additional premium re-
quired because of the application of insurance to 
such newly acquired automobile, shows the purpose 
of notice to be for collection of premium and not for 
denial of coverage. 
National Indemnity Co. vs. Giampapa, (1965), 
62 Wash. 2d ______ , 399 P.2d 81, discusses the term 
newly acquired automobile. In this case, Kilmer, the 
12 
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insured, purchased an automobile liability policy 
covering a 1949 Cadillac with an effective policy 
period from September 16, 1960 to September 16, 
1961. On March 11, 1961, the Cadillac became in-
operable and Kilmer thereafter used a 1956 Ford 
he had owned when he acquired the policy designat-
ing the 1949 Cadillac. No notice was given to the 
company that Kilmer desired to substitute the 1956 
Ford for the Cadillac until after an accident oc-
curred on March 15, 1961, while Kilmer was oper-
ating the Ford. The Washington Court held there 
was coverage as to the 1956 Ford on the theory the 
Ford was a replacement for a car that had been 
junked. The court said the purpose of the notice pro-
vision was to limit the liability of the insurance com-
pany to the operation of one automobile by an in-
sured. 
Birch vs. Harbor Insurance Co., (1954), 126 
C.A. 2d 714, 272 P.2d 784, is a case involving an 
identical provision relating to coverage on a newly 
acquired automobile. In this case, newly acquired 
automobile was defined as follows: 
" ( 4) Newly Acguired Auto~oile -. an auto-
mobile ownership of which is acquired by the 
named' insured who is the owner of the des-
cribed automobile, if the named insured no-
tifies the company within thirty d~ys follo~­
ing the date of its delivery ~o him, .and }f 
either it replaces an automo?1le described m 
this policy or the company u~sures all auto-
mobiles owned by the named msured at such 
13 
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delivery date; but the insurance with respect 
to the newly acquired automobile does not 
~pply to any loss against which the named 
msured has other valid and collectible insur-
a!lce. The n~med insured shall pay any addi-
t10:r;ial prem1u~ required because of the appli-
cation of the msurance to such newly acquir-
ed automobile." 
In this case the policy described a 1950 Ford 
and was issued to one Martin on July 5, 1950, for a 
term of one year. On the evening of November 22, 
1950, Martin acquired and took delivery of a 1935 
Chevrolet. On the afternoon of September 22, 1950, 
Martin was involved in an automobile accident while 
driving the Chevrolet. In this case the court held 
there was coverage for Martin as the Chevrolet re-
placed the described automobile saying there was 
coverage for a thirty day period involving the re-
placement automobile even though no notice of de-
livery of the additional automobile had been given. 
In Hoffman vs. Illinois National Casualty Co., 
(1947) 159 F.2d 564, the 7th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed a judgment in favor of an assured un-
der a policy similar to the one involved here. In the 
Illinois National Casualty Company policy it was 
provided that the named insured notify the com-
pany within thirty days following the date of deliv-
ery of a newly acquired automobile. The tractor 
owned by the plaintiff was involved in an accident 
on April 1, 1943. Defendant was notified of this ~c­
cident and a claim for damages was made by plam-
14 
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tiff. On April 9, 1943, while the claim was pending 
the plaintiff purchased another tractor and ther~ 
after used this tractor. On April 12, 1943, the claim 
for damages to the first tractor was settled and 
plaintiff said nothing about wanting coverage on 
the new tractor. On April 16, while being operated 
by plaintiff's agent, it was involved in a serious ac-
cident. The court held there was coverage for the 
second accident saying there was automatic cover-
age on the second tractor for a period of thirty days 
after its delivery to the plaintiff or insured. 
In Y ahnke vs. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
(1966), 4 Ariz. App. 287, 419 P.2d 548, the facts 
are different. However, the Arizona Appellate Court 
states there is coverage for a newly acquired auto-
mobile if, within thirty days of delivery of it, the 
company is notified. 
Since coverage is automatic through the thirty 
day period after delivery of a newly acquired ve-
hicle, failure to give notice of a newly acquired auto-
mobile is not a defense. 
In a· recent case the Montana Supreme Court 
in G"lacier General Assurance Co. vs. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co., (1968), ---- Mont ..... , 
436 P. 2d 533, the court stated that the "newly ac-
quired automobile" clause is intended to benefit the 
insured and should be liberally construed in his fa-
vor. The court in this case held that although the 
insured did not give notice to the defendant insurer 
15 
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within thirty days after acquiring the newly acquir-
ed automobile as required by the "newly acquired 
automobile" clause, the new automobile was covered 
as to an accident which occurred during the thirty 
day notice period. 
In the Glacier General case, Emelyn Stuart, 
mother of SherE:an L. Stuart, owned a 1955 Chev-
rolet covered by a liability policy issued by State 
Farm Mutual for a period effective through April 
22, 1963. On February 4, 1963, Sherman L. Stuart, 
the son, purchased a 1957 Cadillac and obtained 
liability coverage on this automobile with Glacier 
General effective as of February 4, 1963. On April 
8, 1963, Emelyn and Sherman L. Stuart purchased 
as joint tenants a 1959 Chevrolet and transferred in 
part payment thereof the 1955 Chevrolet insured 
under State Farm's policy. Thereafter, on April 22, 
1963, Sherman L. Stuart was in an accident while 
operating the 1959 Chevrolet. Glacier General af-
forded coverage under its liability policy to Sherman 
L. Stuart. However, State Farm denied coverage to 
Emelyn and Sherman L. Stuart and the action was 
instituted by Glacier General Assurance to compel 
contribution from State Farm for the sums it had 
expended in settling claims. 
The Montana Court held there was coverage 
under the State Farm Mutual policy and that cover-
age was automatic through the thirty day desig-
nated period and that it was immaterial whether 
or not the insurance company had notice of a newly 
16 
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acquired automobile within the thirty day notice 
period. The court stated that since coverage was 
automatic through the designated period it was im-
material whether or not the insured did not notify 
the company of the acquisition of the newly acquir-
ed automobile or whether the insured did or did 
not pay an additional premium. The court also point-
ed out that even if Sherman L. Stuart had not in-
tended that he have coverage under the State Farm 
policy, that the policy was nevertheless in force and 
effect according to its terms and that coverage 
should be afforded. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court should be reversed and directed 
as a matter of law to enter judgment in favor of the 
appellants because: 
1. English gave notice within twenty-two days 
of the delivery of the automobile he was operating 
at the time of the accident. 
2. The purpose of the notice clause is to assist 
the insurance company to collect an additional pre-
mmm. 
3. The defendant can not show it was preju-
diced by the replacement of the 1966 Monza Corvair 
for the described 1964 Impala. 
4. The lower court erred in holding that noti-
fication to Dairyland was required by English on 
March 16, 1966. 
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5. The policy is ambiguous if it requires notice 
to be given on March 16, 1966, as claimed by re-
spondent. 
6. The insurance policy should be liberally con-
strued to protect the interest of the insured and the 
intent of the company is not controlling. 
For these reasons appellants respectfully sub-
mit the lower court should be reversed and directed 
to enter judgment ordering Dairyland to afford cov-
erage to George Martin English for claims arising 
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